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Kicking the Habit: Russia's Addiction to
Nuclear Waste Dumping at Sea
JASON H. EATON*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Russian Navy's nuclear experience is ending much as it
began. The only difference is the scale of the damage inflicted on
people and the environment. When the K-19 entered the Soviet fleet
as its first nuclear-propelled ballistic missile submarine, the Soviet
Union extolled the boat's technological advances.' The crew was re-
warded with smoked fish, chocolates and cheeses, chow other sailors
envied.2 The perks soon were eclipsed, however, after a nuclear reac-
tor cooling accident threatened to incinerate the ship.3 Crewmembers
sacrificed themselves to radiation in order to weld a new cooling sys-
tem.4 The ship made it back to Russia under tow. The crew was not
so lucky.'
"Right on the spot their appearances began changing. Skin not
protected by clothing began to redden, faces and hands began to swell.
Dots of blood began to appear on their foreheads, under their hair.
Within two hours, we couldn't recognize them," said Capt. Nikolai
Zateyev. "People died fully conscious, in terrible pain. They couldn't
speak, but they could whisper. They begged us to kill them.'
Of the twenty-two men killed, six were so radioactive that their
corpses were entombed secretly in Moscow.7 Their families were not
notified.8 The gear used to treat the crew at hospitals was de-
stroyed.9 And those delectables aboard the K-19 were put onto a
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1. Matt Bivens, Horror of Soviet Sub's '61 Tragedy Told, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 3, 1994,
at Al.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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9. Id.
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barge along with clothing, equipment and the sailors' possessions.' °
That barge was moored off the Kola Peninsula with warning signs."
But the signs were ignored, and the barge was plundered for its valu-
ables.12 "Who knows what became of those [people] once they'd sam-
pled the delicacies of that damned barge," Zateyev said. 3
Equally unknown is the total damage that more than thirty years
of Russian nuclear propulsion has inflicted upon the sea. Until the
end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union,"'
information concerning nuclear propulsion was considered a state se-
cret. 5 Residents of the USSR and surrounding countries were unable
to determine the magnitude of nuclear propulsion production. Equally
unknown was the number of accidents occurring at nuclear facilities
or aboard ships. And while Russians are a technologically-advanced
people, they lack a systematic approach to deal with their nuclear
waste. Even if they had better nuclear waste safety measures, Rus-
sian citizens themselves lack the incentive to become involved in
decisions concerning nuclear waste disposal.
This paper examines the amount of radiation released into the
marine environment from Russia and its predecessor. Part II de-
scribes Russia's nuclear propulsion program and its dumping of nucle-
ar waste at sea. Part III examines Russia's environmental laws and
applicable international law. Part IV suggests three methods to im-
prove the nuclear situation in Russia as it pertains to the sea. First,
additional aid given to Russia should be tied to environmental assess-
ments of the nuclear problem. Second, Russia should enact technolo-
gy-forcing laws to reduce emissions on an "as practicable as possible"
basis. Third, Russia should promote private land ownership as a
means of encouraging environmental enforcement. Part V concludes
that adoption of these recommendations would reduce the harm to the
environment by breaking Russia's dependence on ocean dumping.
II. THE LEGACY OF RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM
Russia's environmental destruction can be traced to Stalin's
obsession with industrialization.'" Stalin's five-year plans for agri-
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES AccoRD, Dec. 8, 1991 (Rus. Legis.)
1991 WL 496610) (the USSR ceased to exist when Russia, Ukraine and Belarus
signed the accord).
15. Kathleen M. Maloney-Dunn, Russia's Nuclear Waste Law: A Response to the
Legacy of Environmental Abuse in the Former Soviet Union, 10 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 365, 385 (1993).
16. Peter M. Langrind, An Overview of Environmental Law in the USSR, 11
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 483, 485 (1991) (Stalin's push for ever-greater
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culture and industrial production paid no heed to environmental
issues. 7 The Second World War generated greater emphasis on the
industrial output needed to meet the demands of battle.' After the
war, rather than reduce its industrial drive, the Soviet Union pressed
for more industrialization. Production of more goods meant bonuses
for workers; compliance with environmental laws yielded no such re-
wards.9
The rush to nuclear weapons and nuclear energy in the face of
such lax environmental controls has been catastrophic. The creation of
atomic destruction and power has led to the "creation of a problem of
handling large quantities of radioactive waste, whose solution was
never given special attention."
21
A. The Soviet Nuclear Propulsion Program
Nuclear power plants are the ideal steam generator for submar-
ines, and nuclear power's advantages over oil-fired plants were not
lost on the Soviets. Nuclear reactors can be built smaller than oil-fired
plants.2' They don't need any air.22 The concentration of energy on a
weight and volume basis is greater than oil.2 The nuclear reaction
generates heat, which is used to boil water into steam.24 The high-
pressure steam pushes turbines, which generate electricity and turn
the submarine's propeller.25
The Soviet Union's nuclear propulsion program began with the
creation of a fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers.26 Quick to follow
was a fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines such as the K-19."
In addition, the Soviet Union produced a series of nuclear-propelled
ballistic missile submarines carrying nuclear warheads.' Although
the United States was the first nation to build a nuclear submarine,
industry "created in the minds of the Soviet central planners a maniacal compul-
sion to increase industrial output that ran roughshod over environmental concerns").
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Maloney-Dunn, supra note 15, at 386.
20. FACTS AND PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE DUMPING OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE IN
THE SEAS SURROUNDING THE TERRITORY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION § 2,
GREENPEACE (Russian trans., Oct. 24, 1993) (materials from a government report on
the dumping of radioactive waste, commissioned by the President of the Russian
Federation) [hereinafter FACTS AND PROBLEMS]. A copy of the report is available in
English from Greenpeace, 1436 U Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009.
21. TOM CLANCY, SUBMARINE 110 (1993).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. FACTS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 20, at § 4.
27. Id. See generally, CLANCY, supra note 21, at 250.
28. Id.
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the Soviet Union quickly caught up.' By 1990, the USSR had put
230 nuclear submarines to sea.3 ° The U.S. had launched 170.31
Today, Russia possesses sixty percent of the world's nuclear reac-
tors.32 It has about 235 warships with nuclear power plants.33 Ano-
ther thirteen reactors are inside icebreakers operated by the
Murmansk Shipping Company.34 Russian submarines typically carry
two nuclear reactors driving one screw. 5 Russian ballistic missile
submarines also carry between eight and twenty-four intercontinental
nuclear missiles." The reactors within the Russian attack subma-
rines use a liquid-metal cooling system, which while generating great-
er heat transfer, has made them difficult to cool and refuel.37
About 100 nuclear submarines await decommissioning." By the
year 2000, the Russians will add another eighty nuclear submarines
to the backlog as arms control treaties take effect.39 And even as old
Russian submarines pile up at navy yards, the Russian government
continues to invest in stealthier nuclear-propulsed submarines.' The
nuclear race Russia so adamantly sought to win, however, is return-
ing to haunt them as it becomes clear that Russia failed to consider
what to do with the ships at the end of their life cycles."
B. Lack of Nuclear Waste Storage and Treatment Facilities
When Russia built its submarines, they were completed "without
a thought to the future."42 Today the Russian Navy is being swal
lowed by nuclear waste. The operating navy's ships produce about
20,000 cubic meters of liquid radioactive waste and 6,000 tons of solid
29. Joshua Handler, No Sleep in the Deep for Russian Subs, THE BULLETIN OF
THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Apr. 1993, at 7.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. FACTS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 20, at § 4.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. CLANCY, supra note 21, at 250-70 (A "screw" is navy parlance for "propel-
ler").
36. Id.
37. CDR George R. Kraus, U.S.N.(Ret.), Papa, Alpha, and Soviet Submarine
Innovation, PROCEEDINGS, Feb. 1994, at 88.
38. John J. Fialka, U.S. Is Studying Ways to Help Russia Dispose of Aging
Nuclear Submarines, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1993, at A5C.
39. Handler, supra note 29, at 7.
40. Rob Holzer, How Far Under for Subs?, NAVY TIMES, Oct. 17, 1994, at 42.
Russia will launch the Papa-IX attack submarine in 2005. The submarine will rival
the United State's new Seawolf (SSN-21). Id.
41. Norman Friedman, World Naval Developments, PROCEEDINGS, Oct. 1994, at 91-
92 (Weapons-grade plutonium and uranium appear to be slipping through the Russia
government's fingers as well. Western governments have uncovered several attempted
sales of the material to Third-World countries).
42. Handler, supra note 29.
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radioactive waste a year." Of the thirty-five out-of-service subma-
rines in the Pacific Fleet, only half have had their nuclear fuel re-
moved." The situation is worse in the Northern Fleet, where nuclear
fuel has been removed from only a fourth of its forty-five retired sub-
marines.' According to the Russian naval officer in charge of decom-
missioning Pacific Fleet boats, the fleet can process only one-and-one-
half submarines a year." At the current rate of decommissioning, it
will take more than three decades to scrap old Pacific Fleet subma-
rines.47 And the Pacific Fleet is ahead of the Northern Fleet, which
just initiated a program." By the year 2000, Russia will have 300
nuclear reactors waiting to be scrapped.4
There is no room for the resulting nuclear waste. "Our storage
facilities - two in the North and two in the Far East - are almost
100 percent filled and there's no place to put spent fuel," according to
the admiral in charge of the Russian navy's maintenance.' A land-
based nuclear storage facility will not be ready until the year 2000.51
The Northern Fleet is holding about 21,000 spent fuel assemblies
in storage.5 2 The Murmansk Shipping Company holds another 4,500
assemblies on three floating "technical bases" without room for addi-
tional fuel.' The Pacific Fleet has 8,400 spent fuel assemblies.5' Ad-
ditionally, three submarines with damaged reactors are stored
pierside because their spent fuel cannot be off-loaded."5
The condition at the three floating bases is characterized as being
in an "emergency" status because (for reasons unknown) the assem-
blies stored there are irrecoverable.' A Pacific Fleet nuclear-waste
dump recently leaked radiation when snowmelt caused a floor to
collapse, releasing radiation 1,000 times greater than the normal
background radiation level.5 7 The Pacific Fleet responded to the cri-
43. Id.
44. Id. at 7.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. Some observers estimate the Russians will take 50 to 70 years to
completely retire their submarines. See Viktor Kitovkin, More Environmental Disas-
ters Predicted for Russia: Safe Disposal of Scrapped Nuclear Ships Lag Due to Lack
of Funds, IZVESTIA, July 9, 1993, at 6.
48. Handler, supra note 29, at 7-8.
49. Id. at 7.
50. Kitovkin, supra note 47, at 6.
51. Handler, supra note 29, at 8.
52. FACTS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 20, at 26.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. (One of the submarines apparently suffered an explosion and fire
pierside in 1985).
56. Id. at 27.
57. Radioactivity Leaks at Russian Nuclear Waste Site, Japan Economic
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sis by building floating reactor holds.' By dismantling a submarine's
outer hull and welding the reactor compartment to two adjoining
compartments, the Russians have constructed floating holds.59 These
reactor holds then are towed to the nuclear submarine base at
Vladivostok and tied to the pier.' The more typical response of the
Russians has been to dump its nuclear waste at sea. This is the result
of Russia's "unreadiness to develop" nuclear waste treatment and
storage facilities."'
C. The History of Russia's Nuclear Waste Dumping
Just as the United States was the first nation to develop a nucle-
ar submarine, so too it was the first to dump nuclear materials at
sea.62 Russia's first nuclear-waste dumping in 1959 was tied to its
testing of nuclear-powered submarines and the icebreaker Lenin.' In
1960, the USSR began the regular practice of dumping liquid radioac-
tive waste, and in 1964, the dumping of solid radioactive waste, into
Northern and Far Eastern oceans." The Russian government esti-
mates that it has dumped 24 kCi of liquid radioactive waste into the
marine environment, primarily into the Barents Sea."5  The
Murmansk Shipping Company, builder of the icebreakers, stopped
dumping liquid radioactive waste at sea in 1984.' The Russian Na-
vy, however, continues to dump liquid radioactive waste at sea67 be-
cause it lacks storage space and funds to build disposal facilities on
land.'
Newswire, June 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, JEN File. The fleet
lacks the money to seal the breach and repairs have been postponed indefinitely.
The Russian Navy refuses to allow civilian inspectors on its facility. Id.
58. Handler, supra note 29, at 8.
59. Id. By stripping the ship to its reactor, the Pacific Fleet saves 4.1 billion
rubles (1990 value) if it avoids the cost of maintaining its submarines pierside with
their crews. Id.
60. Id.
61. FACTS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 20, at 25.
62. Id. at 3. The first dumping of radioactive waste at sea occurred in 1946
about 80 miles off the coast of California. Great Britain began dumping in 1949,
followed by Japan in 1955. Id. The Soviet Union's first nuclear waste dumping at
sea occurred in 1959 when it discarded 600 cubic meters of low-level radioactive
waste. Id. at 10.
63. Id. at 10.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 11. This does not include radioactive leaking from on-shore facilities
or nuclear submarine accidents. The Kara Sea received 8,500 Ci; the Barents Sea
12,153 Ci; the White Sea 100 Ci; and the Baltic Sea .2 Ci. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. See also Fred Hiatt, Russia Rethinks Nuclear Dumping, WASH. POST,
Oct. 21, 1993, at A22 (Russian navy backs down from plan to dump 800 tons of
liquid radioactive waste after Japan protests the dumping of 900 tons of liquid
radioactive waste into the Japan Sea.)
68. Id.
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While it continues to dump liquid radioactive waste, the status of
Russian dumping of solid radioactive waste at sea is uncertain. The
Murmansk Shipping Company stopped dumping solid radioactive
waste at sea in 1986.69 The Russian Navy continued dumping solid
radioactive waste at least until 1992.7" There is no public informa-
tion about the amount of solid nuclear waste the Russian government
has disposed of at sea since 1992.
According to the Russian government, the greatest amount of
solid radioactive waste was dumped between 1967 and 1982."' Most
of this waste consisted of low- and medium-level radioactive waste
generated during the operation of both surface ships and subma-
rines.72 The greatest environmental concerns stem from the disposal
at sea of reactors, many with fuel still loaded. Off the coast of Novaya
Zemlia, a northern Russian island, the government has placed:
one submarine with two loaded reactors;
a reactor section with two reactors loaded with spent fuel;
a reactor section with one reactor with loaded spent fuel;
one reactor without fuel;
one submarine reactor with spent fuel; and
one reactor assembly with a partial load of spent fuel.73
All the reactors with spent fuel except one were filled with a
hardening mixture designed to prevent salt-water exposure to radioac-
tive sources for up to 500 years.74 Even so, the safety of the Russian
measures are suspect. Witnesses to nuclear-waste dumping told the
Russian government that at times the navy shot at the metal contain-
ers to speed their sinking.75 In addition, the nuclear waste was not
separated from other hazardous wastes before dumping.6
Not all the nuclear reactors dumped with fuel were intentional
scuttles. In 1989, the submarine Komsomolets sank 300 miles off the
69. FACTS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 20, at 12.
70. Id. at 16. In 1992, the Russian Navy dumped 2,741 cubic meters of solid
radioactive waste into the Sea of Japan and off the coast of Kamchatka. The same
year, the Russian Navy dumped 6,652 cubic meters of liquid radioactive waste. Id.
at tbl. 9.
71. Id. at 12.
72. Id. at 11.
73. Id. at 12. The six submarine reactors were dumped with fuel in place
because reactor accidents rendered the cores too hot to remove. The reactor assem-
bly, from the icebreaker Lenin, was sunk for the same reason. Id.
74. Id. at 12-13.
75. Id. at 19. Solid radioactive waste was put into steel containers designed to
corrode one millimeter each century. Because the containers used were so thin,
radioactive material should reach the ocean within 10 years of dumping. Id. at 20.
76. Id. at 20.
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Norwegian coast.77 When the submarine hit the ocean floor at a
depth of 5,525 feet, the submarine exploded and its titanium hull
breached.7" Two nuclear torpedoes on board were damaged as well.79
Salt water is expected to reach the plutonium in the torpedoes within
five to six years." When the plutonium hits the water, it will meld
with water particles and drift for tens of miles.8' While the amount
of plutonium that will be released is small in comparison to previous
amounts of radioactivity introduced into the Arctic, the disintegration
of a Russian nuclear hulk worries Norwegian fishers. "When the leaks
start, no matter how small, no one will buy Norwegian fish."
2
The Komsomolets is not alone on the ocean floor. Experts esti-
mate it is joined by about fifty nuclear weapons.' Two United States
nuclear submarines, the Thresher and the Scorpion, also lie on the
ocean floor.' They are joined by Russian nuclear submarines lost off
Cape Cod, northwest of Hawaii, southwest of the Azores, northwest of
Spain, and northeast of Bermuda.'
D. Effects of Dumping on Ocean Ecosystems
Radiation in high doses can kill instantly, but scientists debate
the effects of low level radioactive waste on people and the environ-
ment." All life is subject to a continual shower of "background" radi-
ation emanating from space and from within the earth.87 The ques-
77. Norman Polmar, Campaigning for the Komsomolets, PROCEEDINGS, Mar.
1994, at 76-77.
78. Id.
79. Id. The nuclear torpedoes carry 20 pounds of plutonium. In comparison,
Arctic oceans have been exposed to between 450 and 650 pounds of plutonium
already through nuclear weapons testing. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. quoting Igor Spassky, designer of the Komsomolets.
83. Id.
84. Id. See also Robert Cooke, The Nuclear Sea, NEWSDAY, Jan. 11, 1994, at 55.
The U.S. also lost two capsules carrying nuclear materials for bombs when a B-47
bomber carrying them was lost between Florida and Europe.
85. Cooke, supra note 84, at 55. The Russians have lost about 24 submarine-
launched nuclear missiles and at least six nuclear torpedoes. Id. Not all man-intro-
duced radiation has come from military operations. In 1964, radiation from a
nuclear power generator aboard a satellite reentering the earth's atmosphere scat-
tered plutonium across the earth's surface. P. Kilho Park, et.al., Radioactive Wastes
and the Oceans: An Overview, in 3 RADIOACTIVE WASTES AND THE OCEAN 3, 22 (P.
Kilho Park, ed. 1983).
86. NICHOLAS LENSSEN, NUCLEAR WASTE: THE PROBLEM THAT WON'T Go AWAY
16 (WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE) (Dec. 1991) [hereinafter WORLDWATCH].
87. Id. at 17. Radiation breaks the bonds holding molecules together, which
leads to cell death or mutation. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, HEALTH EFFECTS OF
EXPOSURE TO Low LEVELS OF IONIZING RADIATION 9, 65 (National Academy Press
1990).
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tion is whether additional human-generated radiation, diluted by
ocean water, is harmful.
Some studies suggest that marine organisms are less sensitive to
radiation than people." However, assessing the impact of radiation
on marine life is difficult due to problems of accounting for the differ-
ing factors of source, dosage, and time exposed. 9 Additionally, scien-
tists have difficulty determining how deep-sea ocean currents and sed-
imentation affect radioactive-waste dispersal and its subsequent in-
take by marine life.' The result is that while governments cannot
"choose an abiotic dump site in the ocean," neither can they be sure
how nuclear-waste dumping at sea will affect marine life or the food
chain.9
Policymakers argue that until scientists agree on the effects of
ocean dumping, such practices should be banned.92 The Russian gov-
ernment, on the other hand, believes that "there is no danger to any-
one ... and, if no means of processing the radioactive waste on shore
is found, life itself will force us to discharge it into the sea again." 3
Current studies appear to support Russia's position. A recent Russian-
Japanese-South Korean scientific study of the Sea of Japan found
radioactivity at dumping sites within normal background levels."
Another study of dump sites in the Kara Sea found that contamina-
tion was localized and not harmful to nearby areas.95 Despite these
88. Park, supra note 85, at 19.
89. Id. See also WORLDWATCH, supra note 86, at 16-17 (discussing differences
between doses and period of exposure in assessing radiation effects on humans).
90. Park, et. al., Requirements for Radioactive Waste Management in the Ocean,
in 3 RADIOACTIVE WASTES AND THE OCEAN, supra note 85, at 481, 497.
91. Id. at 503. Governments should study nuclear waste dumping at sea thor-
oughly lest they inadvertently "short-circuit[] otherwise remote links to man." Id.
Non-scientific factors also weigh heavily in the argument, including the dependence
of some nations on ocean resources, the costs and benefits of nuclear power, and
the belief that the ocean requires special protection. Judith Spiller & Cynthia
Hayden, Radwaste at Sea: A New Era of Polarization or a New Basis for Consen-
sus?, 19 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 345, 351 (1988).
92. Nations Agree on Limits to Sea Dumping, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, Oct. 7,
1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, REUWLD file. ("If scientists cannot agree,
it's better not to risk the marine environment," according to Dik Tromp, the chair-
man of the London Convention on Dumping.).
93. Pacific Fleet Commander Denies Japanese Submarine Radiation Danger
Story, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Apr. 23, 1994, translating ITAR-
TASS, 0136 GMT, Apr. 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, BBCSWB File
(statement of Vice Admiral Georgiy Gurinov).
94. Okean Expedition Find No Ecological Damage From Nuclear Waste Dump-
ing, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Apr. 29, 1994, translating Russian
broadcast from Vladivostok, 0715 GMT, Apr. 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, World
Library, BBCSWB File.
95. Radioactive Contamination in Kara Sea Said to [Be] Localized, BBC SUMMA-
RY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Oct. 7, 1994, translating ITAR-TASS, 1445 GMT, Sep.
22, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, BBCSWB File.
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studies, only the Russians are willing to conclude the dumpings are
not harmful. The United Nations is studying Russia's once-secret
dumping grounds, including the area around the Komsomolets." The
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is studying the effects of
military-generated radioactive pollution.9" Until science can provide
answers to the unpredictability of nuclear-waste dumping at sea,
prudence requires that governments create alternate means of han-
dling such wastes.
III. LEGAL REGIMES GOVERNING RUSSIAN NUCLEAR DUMPING
The dumping of nuclear waste at sea is governed by the London
Convention on Dumping.9" The Soviet Union was a signatory to the
convention,99 and Russia accepted the convention as part of its as-
sumption of the USSR's obligations.'" The convention prohibits the
dumping of pollution into seas, other than internal waters.' 1 The
ban on pollution does not apply, however, to vessels with sovereign
immunity, ' such as warships, but the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) requires that data on nuclear dumping be submitted
regardless of the source. 3 Russia admits that its dumping was con-
ducted in violation of the London Convention.'" In addition, Russia
is a signatory to the Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, ' which requires that Russia
reduce Baltic Sea pollution. Russia also is a party to the Convention
96. Thomas Land, United Nations: UN to Study Seas Used for Nuclear Dump-
ing, REUTER TEXTLINE, May 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTRAN
File. The first foreigners to have access to the area off the Novaya Zemlya islands
were Norwegians who began a joint study of the area with Russia in August, 1994.
Russia Opens Undersea Nuclear Waste Site to Foreign Inspection, CHI. TRIB., Aug.
23, 1994, at 7.
97. Jean-Marie Cadiou, The Environmental Legacy of the Cold War, NATO REV.,
Oct. 1993, at 34. NATO currently is working on a study, Cross-Border Environmen-
tal Problems Emanating from Defence-Related Installations and Activities, which will
focus on both chemical and radioactive pollution. Id.
98. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matters, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120, in NAGENDRA
SINGH, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW CONVENTIONS 2526 (1983).
99. Id. (the Convention came into effect for the USSR in 1976).
100. Commonwealth of Independent States Accord, supra note 14.
101. London Convention, art. I-IV. Art. I states that signatories "shall promote
the effective control of all sources of pollution of the marine environment, and
pledge themselves especially to take all practicable steps to prevent pollution of the
sea . . . ." Id. Art. IV bans some dumping, and requires permits from the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for dumping of radioactive wastes. London
Convention, art. IV.
102. London Convention, art. VII.
103. FACTS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 20, at 2.
104. Id. at 10.
105. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea
Area, 13 I.L.M. 544 (1974).
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on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution," which bans
radioactive waste dumping in the Black Sea.
10 7
Furthermore, there is no lack of Russian environmental law. By
1987, the USSR had passed more than 1,000 environmental laws."°
However, these laws were ineffective because they contained no en-
forcement means and were generally ignored.' °9 The Russian Navy
dumped radioactive waste at sea despite its own regulations and the
regulations of other agencies prohibiting such dumping." The Rus-
sian Navy benefited from a hole in the nation's environmental laws,
which failed to address nuclear hazards."' The Russian parliament
has passed a bill limiting nuclear waste disposal."' Overall, how-
ever, the Russian environmental law system has "exerted very little
influence over Soviet industrial practices or military policies to
date.""
Recent Russian law, however, is different from its predecessor's
in many ways. The Russian Constitution includes three articles re-
lating to the environment. The first, article 9, states that land is the
"basis of the life and activity of the peoples."" 4 In addition, every
Russian "has the right to a decent environment, reliable information
about the state of the environment" and payment for personal or
property damage because of ecological harms."5 Finally, the Russian
Constitution states that every citizen is "obliged to protect nature and
the environment and to show solicitude for natural wealth.""6 In
106. Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution, 32 I.L.M.
1101 (1993).
107. Id.
108. Environmental Law and Policy in the USSR, 17 ENVT'L L. REP. (Envt'l L.
Inst.) 10,068 (Mar. 1987).
109. Id.
110. FACTS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 20, at 9.
111. Maloney-Dunn, supra note 15, at 379.
112. Russia Passes Bill to Limit Nuclear Waste Disposal, Japan Economic
Newswire, July 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, JEN File. The bill,
passed July 7, 1994, is Russia's first comprehensive nuclear waste law. The law
bans dumping liquid nuclear waste beneath the earth's surface and in waterways.
The government does, however, continue to assert its exemption to the international
ban on nuclear waste dumping at sea. The law also limits the release of informa-
tion about nuclear waste dumping. Id.
113. Id. Despite the lack of facilities or laws to adequately handle the nuclear
waste dilemma, Russia has engaged in negotiations to receive Western nations'
hazardous waste. The Swiss nuclear power industry admitted to such negotiations
in September, 1994 after Greenpeace leaked a secret memorandum to the press.
The Swiss plan calls for shipping nuclear waste to a yet-to-be-complete'd nuclear
recycling plant. Swiss Nuclear Power Industry Admits to Talks on Shipping Toxic
Wastes to Russia, IN'L. ENVTL. DAILY, Sept. 21, 1994, available in WESTLAW,
BNA-IED fie.
114. RUssIAN FEDERATION CONST., art. 9, cl. 1 (Dec. 12, 1993).
115. Id. at art. 42.
116. Id. at art. 58.
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contrast, the USSR Constitution only provided for the protection of
the environment for future consumptive use.117
In addition to including the environment in its constitution,
Russia passed an environmental law in 1992 defining the rights of
citizens with regard to the environment.' The law also bans the
importation and disposal of nuclear waste."' Citizens are given the
right to sue polluters,' and to demand closure of polluters for non-
compliance. 12 ' Despite these legal regimes, Russia has not yet been
able to deal effectively with its nuclear waste dilemma. A lack of
information regarding environmental degradation, the absence of a
comprehensive nuclear waste handling policy, and the need for better
use of land-ownership rights all have kept Russia hooked on dumping
at sea.
IV. KICKING RUSSIA OF THE NUCLEAR DUMPING HABIT
Russia has not been the only country that dumped nuclear waste
at sea. Cold War-era nuclear activities by both sides have caused
"such formidable damage to the environment, to human health and
perhaps even to the human genotype, that the consequences will be
felt for decades."2 Even so, several nuclear-capable powers still re-
main drawn to the concept of the seas as the great diluter of nuclear
pollution. Great Britain, France, China, and Belgium had objected to
a proposal to ban all nuclear dumping at sea until recently.'m Great
Britain said that while it believed that controlled dumping presented
no threat to the environment or human health, it would comply.'
Russia remains the only holdout.'
25
A. Use of Trade to Encourage Responsible Nuclear Waste Treatment
When the issues of trade and the environment are mentioned in
the same breath, the conversation inevitably turns to sustainable
117. USSR CONST., art. 18. (1977), in THE SOVIET UNION THROUGH ITs LAWS 29
(Leo Hecht ed., 1983) ("In the interest of future generations, necessary steps are to
be taken in the USSR to protect and to make rational use of the land and its
mineral and water resources .... ").
118. RSFSR LAw ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1992) translated by FBIS,
JPRS-TEN-92-007 (Apr. 28, 1992).
119. Id. at art. 50(3).
120. Id. at art. 12.
121. Id. at art. 91.
122. Jean-Marie Cadiou, The Environmental Legacy of the Cold War, NATO REV.,
Oct. 1993, at 33. The concern over transboundary movements of hazardous and
nuclear wastes has spurred the military alliance to start 30 studies concerning
waste disposal. Id. at 34.
123. Radioactive Waste: Ban on Ocean Dumping Accepted by U.K, 33 DAILY
ENv'T REPORT (BNA) d4, Feb. 18, 1994.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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development. As a concept, sustainable development is defined as "an
economic development approach that allows for growth and satisfies
basic human needs while avoiding profligate resource exploitation and
pollution."'26 The reality of sustainable development is more prob-
lematic, since it has yet to be achieved.' But it is a useful guiding
concept for Western countries when determining which projects they
will fund abroad, and for spurring environmental awareness.
Russia has made many trips to Western coffers - to the tune of
$82.9 billion at the end of 1993."= The majority of its loans comes
from Western governments." Additional assistance arrives in the
form of monetary aid from multilateral financing institutions such as
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The money
Russia receives is desperately needed and it barely helps. Russia had
been counting on money pledged by Western nations to fund critical
areas of its budget and thereby reduce inflation. 30 But of the $24
billion pledged in 1992 and the $28 billion offered in 1993, only $4
billion has reached Russia.' When Western nations have come
through with money, it often is tied to bettering the Russian economy
for Western business or is earmarked for specific projects.'32
Currently, Russia is waiting for $1.5 billion in International
Monetary Funds to be released for use in its foreign exchange and for
"general financing."" The World Bank recently made a $300 million
loan to improve 7,200 miles of Russian roads.' Western countries
also have arranged for a $6 billion currency stabilization fund and
$10 billion in export credits. 5 Money for environmental projects in
126. Marvin S. Soroos, From Stockholm to Rio: The Evolution of Global Environ-
mental Governance, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S 299, 310 (Norman J.
Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 2d ed. 1994).
127. Margaret Bowman & David Hunter, Environmental Reforms in Post-Commu-
nist Central Europe: From High Hopes to Hard Reality, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 923,
975 (1992).
128. Kenneth N. Gilpin, Mopping Up Foreign Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1994, at
C1, C5.
129. Id. (Russia owes 25 percent of the $82.9 billion debt to commercial banks,
the rest to Western governments.).
130. Jeffrey Sachs, Reformers in Retreat: Indecision Costing West its Chance to
Rescue Russia, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Feb. 6, 1994, at 83A. Mr. Sachs is a well-known
international trade professor at Harvard University who was an adviser to the
Russian government. By paying for part of the budget, Western nations could
reduce the amount of money the Russian government was printing, and reduce
inflation. That, in turn, would have freed more money for social programs. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Bowman & Hunter, supra note 127, at 976.
133. International Finance: Camdessus Estimates Russia Loan Will Be Approved
Around May 1, 11 INTL TRADE REP. (BNA) 13, Mar. 30, 1994. The IMF loan has
been conditioned on Russia tightening its budget and enacting other reforms. Id.
134. Russia Borrows $300M for Roads, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 18, 1994, at 6.
135. International Finance: Group of Seven Warns Russia About Need for Eco-
nomic Reforms, 11 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 9, Mar. 2, 1994.
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Russia thus far has been limited to paying for the dismantlement of
nuclear missiles. The United States is paying $1.2 billion over three
years toward nuclear-warhead destruction. 36 According to the De-
partment of State, the United States would like to offer more for the
environment, but is limited by its own resources.'
37
Even if the Western world cannot generate the billions of rubles
needed to fund the building of a nuclear waste storage and treatment
facility, it can use its money to promote environmental awareness.
One of the key problems with nuclear dumping at sea and with en-
vironmental problems in Russia generally is the lack of information in
the hands of its citizens and the rest of the world.1 3' Russia has no
law similar to America's Right-to-Know Act."' Nor does Russia have
a law comparable to the United States' National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA).' 4 NEPA's environmental impact statements (EISs) are
required to include the environmental impact of any proposed federal
action and any alternatives." NEPA EISs are then made available
to anyone who wants them." This has the effect of "enrich[ing] the
understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources impor-
tant to the Nation.""4 In contrast, Russian officials have sought to
limit the flow of information to the public.1" Thus, Russians are
without laws that ensure their access to information about the effect
of government actions on the environment. Without independent
sources of information, Russians are likely to continue to receive
inaccurate information about nuclear-waste dumping." Accurate
136. James E. Goodby, Averting Nuclear Chaos: The Tasks Before Us, 4 DEP'T
ST. DIsp. (Oct. 11, 1993).
137. Id. See also Handler, supra note 29, at 9. The U.S. Navy is midway
through a $2.7 billion effort to decommission about 100 nuclear submarines by the
year 2000.
138. See Maloney-Dunn, supra note 15, at 429. See also David A. Colson,
Russia's Radioactive Waste Disposal: A Matter of Grave Concern, 4 DEP'T ST. DISP.
47 (Nov. 22, 1993). ("The international community was deliberately misled by the
USSR. Those responsible did no credit to themselves, and they did a disservice to
the marine environment, the international community and its institutions, their
country, and its people.")
139. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11001-11050 (1988).
140. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(d)
(1988). NEPA requires an environmental impact statement for every "major Federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment .... " 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(C).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i-iii).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(G).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
144. See, Russia Passes Bill to Limit Nuclear Waste Disposal, Japan Economic
Newswire, July 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, JEN File.
145. For instance, one newspaper recently wrote that the Russian government
stopped nuclear-waste dumping at sea in 1991 and that some of the most hazard-
ous waste dumped near the Novaya Zemlya islands in the Arctic Oceans was "not
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information, however, would put Russian citizens in a better position
to pressure governments and change their own polluting behavior.'
With restructuring, Western aid could provide some of that informa-
tion.
The World Bank has a process similar to NEPA through which it
prepares environmental assessments (EAs).'47 The primary goal of
an EA, however, is to "help reduce the risk of cost overruns and de-
lays... as a result of unanticipated environmental disruptions."'
Thus, the World Bank's environmental-assessment process is less
concerned with examining alternatives and getting information to
people than it is with ensuring that its funds are not depleted by
dealings with unforeseen environmental factors. This makes the as-
sessment process nearly valueless for the country receiving the aid. As
Congress made clear when it debated NEPA, "our... present state of
knowledge, our established public policies, and our existing govern-
mental institutions are not adequate to deal with the growing envi-
ronmental problems and crises the Nation faces."'4 9 The assessment
procedure does little to further knowledge when the information it
generates is tailored for funding purposes.
America's NEPA is inadequate to cover the responsibility of pro-
viding environmental assessment information to foreign residents.
Thus far, the Supreme Court has refused to apply environmental laws
abroad because plaintiffs lack standing."' Therefore, application of
NEPA abroad is not an option for people wanting information on U.S.-
sponsored activities. Practically, the people most in need of the infor-
mation lack the resources to bring a NEPA enforcement suit anyway.
NEPA may not apply to multilateral financing institutions because
they are not "federal," even though the United States may provide
most of their capital. American environmental laws therefore fail to
provide a meaningful environmental assessment device for residents
of foreign countries.
very harmful." Vladimir Lagovsky, Lenin's Heart Beats on the Sea Bottom,
RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, May 18, 1994, at 1, 4 translated by Russian Press Digest
available in LEXIS, World Library, SPD File.
146. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992: DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT
87 published for the WORLD BANK by Oxford Univ. Press (1992). Information also
tends to encourage a more rational environmental debate. Id.
147. Id. at 81.
148. Id.
149. Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
quoting S. REP. NO. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess 4 (1969).
150. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1991). While not deciding on
the issue of extraterritoriality, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to challenge a Department of Interior rule stating that the Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988), did not apply abroad. Id.
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On the other hand, the present World Bank structure offers a
good foundation. The United States has pressured multilateral devel-
opment banks to promote sustainable development and require envi-
ronmental assessments by forbidding American directors within these
institutions to vote for any bank action that would significantly affect
the environment. 5' Additionally, the U.S. law contemplates that the
results be given to "affected groups and local nongovernmental organi-
zations."'52 The United States should continue, however, to press for
more meaningful assessments.
First, as under America's NEPA, the multilateral development
banks should be required to focus their assessments on alternatives to
a proposed project. The alternatives should strive to meet the goals of
sustainable development. Providing alternatives ensures that
policymakers will have thought through the proposed project's im-
pact." Additionally, alternatives give local leaders a choice of op-
tions in deciding whether to accept a bank's project or to protest it.
Local constituents are in the best position, by virtue of their historical
link with a specific location, to approve of a project and to determine
how it should be constructed. They have a greater environmental
stake in projects; therefore, they should be aware of all alternatives
before supporting new construction.
The alternatives data are useless, however, unless locals receive
the assessment information. To ensure that they do, Western coun-
tries should use the United Nations as a clearinghouse. The U.N. is
ideally suited to handle the passing-down of information because it is
globally known and has offices worldwide. The multilateral develop-
ment banks, in conjunction with Western governments and the gov-
ernments receiving assistance, should establish and fund environmen-
tal information centers. These centers could be run through U.N.
relief offices, U.N. development offices or the facilities of the multilat-
eral banks and Western governments themselves. The multilateral
banks would be required, before receiving additional capital from the
West, to send their environmental assessments to the centers via the
U.N. The assessments should be provided free of charge to local gov-
ernments, media and citizens in their native languages. Local citizens
should be encouraged to pick up copies of assessments. This would
provide a concrete means of better educating local groups about West-
ern funding projects and the environment in general. Such informa-
tion would encourage interaction between the banks, government, and
citizens. This would, in turn, enable policymakers to better under-
151. International Development and Finance Act of 1989, 22 U.S.C. § 262m-7
(Supp. IV 1992) (A director may vote in favor of a project having a significant
environmental effect if an assessment has been completed and provided to affected
groups.).
152. 22 U.S.C. § 262m-7(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1992).
153. Defenders of Wildlife, 627 F.2d at 1243.
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stand local situations and make decisions that more reasonably reflect
the policy of sustainable development.
Generating information is the best way to use trade to help alle-
viate the environmental problems associated with nuclear-waste
dumping at sea absent agreement among Western nations to build a
nuclear waste storage and treatment facility. Using other trade poli-
cies to solve the problem would not be effective, since trade in general
has only an indirect effect on nuclear waste production. Russia's nu-
clear waste dilemma is a creature of military design, not one resulting
from the rampant use of natural resources to generate trade. Addi-
tionally, the use of trade policies themselves are a "blunt and uncer-
tain tool" for environmental governance because the environment of-
ten can be harmed more by trade policies designed to prevent ecologi-
cal problems." If Western governments are going to push their be-
lief that trade is an environmental issue,' they should provide de-
veloping countries with the information about Western projects need-
ed to meaningfully assess the ecological impacts. Once empowered
with information about the environment, local governments and citi-
zens are less likely to tolerate acts such as Russia's nuclear-waste
dumping, and pressure policymakers to halt such environmentally
degrading practices. "That debate - sure to be vigorous - should be
viewed as an opportunity for dialogue and progress, rather than as a
threat to any particular economic system or order.""s The value of
information becomes greater when viewed as a tool to overcome social
behavior that is environmentally damaging.' As a method of foster-
ing better environmental practices through trade, information via
environmental assessments is the best service the West could provide
to developing countries. The use of other trade-based policies, such as
sanctions, would not have as positive and direct an impact as the
release of information would. Western nations should use their influ-
ence to stimulate the worldwide flow of information about the envi-
ronment. A simple means to accomplish this is through an expanded
environmental assessment program.
154. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992, supra note 146, 67. See generally
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 1190
(1992).
155. Alan Riding, Gore Insists Environment is a Trade Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
15, 1994, at C1.
156. Scott McCallum, Local Action in a New World Order, 23 ENVTL. L. 621, 631
(1993).
157. Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft, Conclusion: The New Environmental
Agenda, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S, supra note 126, at 369-70.
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B. Using Technology-Forcing Laws to Spur Better Environmental
Practices
Regulation of environmental problems manifests itself in two
basic schemes. First, regulators can use health-based approaches
which seek to reduce the amount of harm to people by requiring in-
dustry to meet certain emissions levels."8 The other method of regu-
lation depends on the level of technology available to the entity regu-
lated.'59 This second approach, when combined with a "technology-
forcing" scheme, 60 offers the best solution to putting Russia on a
system of nuclear waste control.
A health-based regulatory scheme for nuclear waste is unwork-
able because of disagreement over the harmfulness of radioactive
waste dumping at sea.'6' The Russian government has reached a
"preliminary conclusion" that the dumping of liquid radioactive waste
poses no danger to the general populace or to people who live in coast-
al areas or work the seas.'62 The Russians cannot, however, deter-
mine the threat to the human environment from the dumped solid
radioactive wastes."8 Scientists still believe information is needed
regarding at-sea radioactive waste disposal, including how biota up-
take radionuclides."6 Without more concrete data, it is impossible to
calculate meaningful health-based standards since there is no indi-
cation, one way or another, exactly how nuclear waste dumping at sea
affects people or the marine environment.
Ideally, a nuclear-waste management scheme has two parts.
First, the waste must be classified and evaluated.'65 This process al-
lows the generator to know what it is dealing with and what storage
conditions and treatments are appropriate." The generator iden-
158. See generally PERCIVAL, supra note 154, at 146-53.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 165-68. "Technology-forcing" is the imposition of standards more
stringent than those attainable by then-available technology to compel polluters to
come up with innovative solutions. Id. at 167.
161. Radioactive Waste: Ban on Ocean Dumping Accepted by U.K, supra note
123.
162. FACTS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 20, at 18.
163. Id. at 20.
164. Park, Requirements for Radioactive Waste Management in the Ocean, in 3
RADIOACTIVE WASTES AND THE OCEAN, supra note 85, at 481, 482. (Information should
be gathered on the behavior of radioactive wastes in saltwater and sediments,
biological uptake and effects of radiation.).
165. INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY WASTE MANAGEMENT SECTION, DIVISION OF
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE, TECHNICAL PAPER IN SUPPORT OF THE CODE OF PRACTICE ON
TRANSBOUNDARY SHIPMENTS OF NUCLEAR WASTES (Apr. 1989), reprinted in
TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENTS AND DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 374, 378 (Barbara Kwiatkowska & Alfred Soons eds., 1993) [hereinafter
TRANSBOUNDARY HAZARDOUS WASTES].
166. Id.
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tifies the best storage and treatment options as the next step. 16 , It
then implements procedures to ensure the safe daily operation of
nuclear waste facilities undertaking these chores.l" The chief inter-
national adviser for countries implementing nuclear programs is the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 169
Russia apparently has a method of determining what wastes are
low, medium and high level radioactive. Until recently, however, no
attempt had been made to quantify the amount of nuclear waste
Russia was generating or how it was dealing with such waste.' A
lack of record-keeping has required a post-hoc expert-generated "best
guess."' The chore of finding storage methods has been left to vari-
ous fleet commanders, apparently without any systematic evaluation
or coordination. Nor is there apparently any type of inspection or
auditing of nuclear-waste storage in the fleets beyond the basic identi-
fication of radioactive levels.7 2 Such a disjointed scheme for nuclear-
waste management suggests that Russia needs to adopt systemic
regulations that put the bureaucracy on a technology-forcing pro-
gram.
173
The Russian technology-control program should be implemented
in three phases. Each phase would lead to greater restrictions on
nuclear waste releases into the environment. The three phases are:
(1) Best Practicable Technology;
(2) Best Available Technology; and
(3) Lowest Achievable Emission Rate.
167. Id. (Looking at the storage and treatment options entails conducting engi-
neering and feasibility studies, safety assessments, environmental impact state-
ments.).
168. Id. at 379-80 (Safety concerns encompass employee training, record-keeping,
quality assurance programs, and independent oversight by inspections and audits).
169. "The General Conference . . . calls upon the [IAEA] to give priority consid-
eration to requests by developing countries for assistance in the field of nuclear
waste management." INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA), RESOLUTION
OF THE IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE ON DUMPING OF NUCLEAR WASTES (Sept. 23,
1988), reprinted in TRANSBOUNDARY HAZARDOUS WASTES, supra note 165, at 355,
356.
170. FACTS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 20, at i.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 10 ('The evaluation of radioecological consequences of dumping [ra-
dioactive waste] on the basis of the information provided . . . is quite problematic
due to the lack of detailed information on the radionucleic content of the waste and
the protective qualities of the containers").
173. Maloney-Dunn, supra note 15, at 368-369. Russia has been debating a new
nuclear-waste law, but it has yet to be passed. The law would supplement the
current environmental law banning the foreign import of nuclear waste by for-
bidding the burial of foreign nuclear waste on Russian soil. It does not, however,
implement any procedures for dealing with current waste problems.
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The most important factor to remember about each of the tech-
nology levels is that they are temporary. Under the U.S. Clean Water
Act, for example, Congress envisioned Best Practicable Technology
applying for no more than three years. 74 No matter what level the
polluters obtain, it would be up to the Russian government to revisit
the technology controls and adjust them as necessary. Under the
Clean Water Act, the EPA must review effluent limitations every five
years and make adjustments as necessary.'75 The result is that the
technology is always ratcheted toward greater limits on pollution.
1. Best Practicable Control Technology
Best Practicable Control Technology (BPT) is the low point of
technological-based controls. BPT is designed to be the entry point in
the system and would allow the Russian government to ease into the
regulation. The key factors to consider should mirror the Clean Water
Act "'76 and include the cost of applying the technology to the benefits
received, the age of the equipment involved, engineering methods, and
environmental impact.'
Because of the cost prohibitiveness of most procedures, the level
of BPT for Russian nuclear-waste level would be low. The main regu-
latory scheme likely would consist of record-keeping requirements,
studies of current procedures, 7 ' and the creation of a general
oversight and inspection regime. However, these are all essential
elements of a nuclear waste regulatory scheme approved under the
IAEA's formulation.'79 It is unlikely, given the current complete lack
of Russian control over its nuclear waste stream, that dumping at sea
would cease. Environmentalists and other nations will continue to
pressure Russia to stop such dumping.' Nevertheless, the inter-
national community must recognize that building a nuclear waste
regulatory scheme after a country is already burdened with such
wastes is an onerous task. As long as the Russian government main-
tains its technology-forcing plan, Western governments should adopt a
supportive stance.
174. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387, 1311(b)(E)
(1988) [hereinafter FWPCA].
175. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(d).
176. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B).
177. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B).
178. Park, Requirements for Radioactive Waste Management in the Ocean, in 3
RADIOACTIVE WASTES AND THE OCEAN, supra note 85, at 481, 502. The importance
of studies in these circumstances cannot be understated. "The intelligent and safe
use of practical waste space will require both scientific knowledge of the environ-
ment and technical understanding of the wastes."
179. TRANSBOUNDARY HAzARDOUS WASTES, supra note 165, at 378.
180. See, GREENPEACE POSITION REGARDING DUMPED REACTORS, GREENPEACE
(March 1993) (on file with author).
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The BPT plan also should include methods for dealing with sunk-
en nuclear submarines outside Russia's territory. Here the application
of BPT necessarily will be on a site-specific basis. The Russian gov-
ernment already has undertaken extensive study of the submarine
Komsomolets."'5 It is unclear whether equally extensive surveys of
wreckage have been conducted for the other submarines lost at sea.
Therefore, application of BPT to these submarines may entail infor-
mation-gathering expeditions and coordination with other countries if
Russia decides to apply its laws extraterritorially. At this stage, it is
unlikely that sealing the vessels or salvaging the submarines would
be financially feasible; therefore, the sunken submarines would re-
main in situ pending the step to the next technology level.
2. Best Available Technology
Once the Russians achieved BPT, their control technology should
jump to Best Available Technology (BAT). BAT reflects a weighing of
the same factors as under BPT'82 except no direct cost-benefit analy-
sis is conducted. Instead, cost is one of the factors entered into the
mix and is no longer the overriding consideration.' The Russians at
this stage could be utilizing the Pacific Fleet's hold-construction strat-
egy to reduce both costs to the government and the number of people
exposed to radiation.' Again, due to Russia's severe financial diffi-
culties, it is doubtful that a total ban on nuclear-waste dumping could
be enacted at this level of technology. Russia could, however, conform
its dumping to IAEA standards, which it presently does not do. Under
the LAEA guidelines, disposal at sea of low- and medium-level radio-
active waste is limited to specially delimitated areas that lie 200
miles offshore in waters deeper than 4,000 meters and are between
fifty degrees North and fifty degrees South.' It is not likely that
Russia could afford more extensive treatment for its lost submarines.
However, at the BAT stage, Russia would be constructing a nuclear
waste treatment and storage facility. The BAT technology level would
require Russia to build on its BPT record-keeping and studies by
enacting controls to ensure the site is built properly and management
plans are in place. This would ensure that when the nuclear storage
181. Polmar, supra note 77, at 77.
182. FWPCA, supra note 174, at 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B).
183. Id. See, e.g. the language of the Clean Water Act, infra note 186, regarding
BPT ("total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction
benefits") as compared with the factors to consider with BAT ("the cost of achieving
such effluent reduction.") FWPCA, supra note 174, at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(b)(1)(B) and
1314(b)(2)(B).
184. Once the boats are dismantled and their nuclear fuel holds constructed,
there is no need for an on-board crew. They would be dismissed and the supervi-
sors of the nuclear-waste storage facility would assume responsibility for monitoring.
185. FACTS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 20, at fig. 1.
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facility comes on-line in the year 2000 there is a complete plan for its
operation and the movement to Lowest Achievable Emission Rate.
3. Lowest Achievable Emission Rate
By the time the Russians have a new nuclear treatment and
storage facility available in the year 2000, the regulatory scheme
should be ratcheted up to Lowest Achievable Emission Rate (LAER).
Under the U.S. Clean Air Act, LAER is "the most stringent emission
limitation which is achieved in practice . .. "18 At this point, Russia
should have a full program in place (which it developed through its
application of BPT and BAT) for the decommissioning of nuclear
submarines. If storage and treatment plans are carried through, Rus-
sia will be able to abide by its London Convention obligations and be
able to cease any low level radioactive waste disposal at sea. In addi-
tion, it should be able to conform to IAEA guidelines for nuclear treat-
ment and disposal facilities. It is under LAER that the Russian gov-
ernment would become a responsible nuclear power.
The success of such a regulatory scheme depends heavily on
bureaucrats whose track records currently are shabby. "[M]any of the
old bureaucratic structures remain .... [t]hese old structures pose
substantial challenges to environmental protection reforms .... ""'
These officials and their institutions will require that reformers use
their political will to ensure that regulatory schemes are meaningful.
Russia already has taken steps to consolidate what had been over-
lapping administrative agencies by creating in 1992 a Ministry of
Ecology and Natural Resources." As Russian leaders face re-organi-
zation and regulation of nuclear activities, they should focus on what
is most appropriate for their country and not what Western countries
would like to see. As it is, none of the former Eastern European coun-
tries can meet all of the European Community environmental stan-
dards.8 9 A BPT to BAT to LAER approach will ensure that Russia
evolves toward the safest and most internationally acceptable nuclear
waste regulatory scheme. That program alone, however, is insufficient
without the will to enforce. As a result, Russia's move toward the
privatization of land should help.
186. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q, 7501(3)(B) (1988 and Supp. II
1990).
187. Bowman & Hunter, supra note 127, at 973.
188. Maloney-Dunn, supra note 15, at 416-17.
189. Bowman & Hunter, supra note 127, at 970.
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C. The Use of Land Values to Foster Better Environmental Decisions
Under the Soviet system, the government held all land." For
nearly 75 years, individuals did not own land. When the USSR col-
lapsed, Russia adopted land values similar to those of the United
States. Today, Russia's constitution provides for private ownership of
land.'9' It states that "[diwellings are inviolable." 92 Individuals
can "freely possess, utilize and dispose of land and other natural
resources provided that this does not damage the environment and
does not violate the rights and legitimate interests of others."' 93 Fur-
thermore, Russians are entitled to money damages when the state
damages their property unlawfully. 94 The adoption of Western land
values, where socialist ideas had taken root, has led to some discon-
tent. The new Russian land system has de-emphasized the agrarian
lifestyle in favor a free-market approach. "A weakening desire to work
the land is a great danger to the national character," says Aleksandr
Solzhenitsyn. "Among our people, the peasant sensibility has been
trod underfoot . . . ."9 Reaction to the system illustrates the strong,
long-cultivated connection between Russia's land and its people. Yet
the new land ownership law offers "a relatively low-transaction-cost
method of inducing people to 'do the right thing' with the earth's
surface.""9 It is this attitude among private landowners that could
be useful in insuring Russia takes steps to control its nuclear waste.
One of the chief advantages private ownership offers over group
ownership is the motivation among individual land owners to police
their land.' 97 Under the old Soviet regime, private individuals had
no recourse when the government harmed the environment. Now,
however, individuals have an incentive to seek money from the gov-
ernment when it harms private property. Not only is the environment
harmed, but their land is injured - property which when sold or
passed down to future generations benefits the owner. These owners
have a personal stake in their land. The government no longer has
190. USSR CONST., art. 10. ("The basis for the economic system of the USSR is
socialist ownership of the means of production in the form of state property (be-
longing to the people), and collective-farm and cooperative property").
191. RUSSIAN FEDERATION CONST., art. 9 ("The land and other natural resources
are utilized and protected in the Russian Federation as the basis of the life and
activity of the peoples inhabiting the corresponding territory. The land and other
natural resources can be in private, state, municipal or other forms of ownership").
192. Id. at art. 25.
193. Id. at art. 36.
194. Id. at art. 53.
195. ALEKSANDR I. SOLZHENITSYN, REBUILDING RUSSIA: REFLECTIONS AND TENTA-
TIVE PROPOSALS 30 (1991).
196. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1327 (1993).
197. Id. at 1328 (The author notes that a "sole owner bears the entirety of any
loss stemming from his slack oversight, whereas a group member bears only a
fraction.").
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the unfettered right to maltreat one's land. Damage inflicted on pri-
vate property from nuclear-powered devices could run into the billions
of rubles, creating a strong incentive for the government to adopt
safer practices. There is doubt, however, whether the Russian govern-
ment will have money to pay such damages. 98 Even so, the pressure
private landowners can exert on governmental agencies can be consid-
erable. As information about contamination in Russia has spread,
more environmental activist groups have arisen, due to looser govern-
ment regulation.' These groups already have prevented some nu-
clear-waste dumping. °°
Further progress in using land ownership as a means of provid-
ing pressure for better environmental practices depends on more
widespread acceptance of the notion of private land. This concept is
completely new to Russia, and should be adopted cautiously. Russian
leaders must develop their own concept of private ownership which
melds both the agrarian values and the new entrepreneurial spirit.
Western countries must remember that their own land values come
from centuries of development. As Russians find their own way with
land ownership, government also must develop and encourage individ-
uals to exercise the rights of land ownership. When combined with
newly created rights of speech20 and assembly,' °2 private owner-
ship rights can help insure that government practices are protective of
the environment. While this benefits the ocean only indirectly, since
no one owns a plot of the sea, it nonetheless is crucial to the devel-
opment of Russian ecological law.0 3 Without private ownership gen-
erating pressure on the government both monetarily, politically, and
collectively with other interest groups, Russia would have no reason
to change its nuclear waste practices from within. International pres-
sure is less useful than internal demand for change. One way for
Russia to find supporters for its economic policies is to build constitu-
198. Larisa Krasavchikova, Comments on the Law on Property in the Russian So-
viet Federated Socialist Republic, 24 ST. MARY's L.J. 481, 493 (1993) (The author
notes that allowing takings-type claims may be more of a political move than one
based on "well-founded regulations of ownership.").
199. Maloney-Dunn, supra note 15, at 416.
200. Id.
201. RUSSIAN FEDERATION CONST., art. 29, cl. 1 ("Each person is guaranteed free-
dom of thought and speech.")
202. Id. at art. 30, cl. 1 ("Each person has the right of association, including the
right to create trade unions to protect his interests. The freedom of the activity of
public association is guaranteed.").
203. Russia has recognized this and implemented the concept of group partici-
pation in ecological matters into the RSFSR LAW ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
supra note 118, at art. 13 ("Environmental associations and other public associ-
ations which perform environmental functions have a right .. . to organize meet-
ings, rallies, picket lines, marches, demonstrations and petition drives and gather
signatures, and to make proposals regarding discussion of projects and referen-
dums.").
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encies based on a strong environmental policy. This would allow the
government to spend its precious administrative capacity more effi-
ciently. A strong environmental policy means the adoption of a pro-
gressive program to halt the disposal of nuclear waste at sea.
V. CONCLUSION
The collapse of the Soviet Union has not been easy on the Rus-
sian people. They bear the brunt of a dangerous Cold War legacy.
Nuclear waste from the days of military expansion haunts their safety
and ability to live in a prosperous economy. It clogs their government,
preventing an easier transition to non-military production. And it
embarrasses them internationally. Yet the tools are there for a pro-
gram, which if adopted and vigorously enforced, could free Russia
from many of these atomic burdens.
First, Western governments should adopt a more extensive sys-
tem of environmental assessments tied to their lending. The creation
of information centers where Russians could obtain information about
proposed projects, alternatives, and environmental impacts would
empower citizens by giving them knowledge. Decades of environmen-
tal damage have been inflicted in the war with the West; the coun-
tries that won now have the opportunity to make that damage clear
and give Russians the information they value in their own societies.
Next, the Russian government should create a technology-based
regulatory scheme which constantly ratchets up the controls on emis-
sions of radioactive waste. Beginning with a basic Best Practicable
Technology scheme, Russia will acquire the information and record-
keeping systems needed to build a stricter nuclear waste management
program. At the Best Available Technology level, Russia can advance
to a better level of nuclear waste management than now present, even
if nuclear waste dumping at sea is not totally stopped. When its new
storage and treatment facility is ready, Russia can move to the Low-
est Achievable Emissions Rate and into the accepted norms within the
international community for nuclear waste control. This
BPT/BAT/LAER program is a gradual easing of control over the sys-
tem where none existed before. It contemplates Russia's sensitive eco-
nomic situation, but yields a result that ultimately is more protective
of the environment.
Insuring that Russia follows its plans for environmental control
requires pressure from people. Russia's new land owners, with their
right to compensation for takings, are the ideal group to accomplish
this goal. Whether government is moved by concerns about paying for
private property claims or by pure political pressure from a group,
Russia's leaders will have to deal with them by generating a more
responsive, efficient environmental program. This program, if success-
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ful, could result in constituencies for Russian leaders to draw upon
when enacting other reform measures.
All waste is transboundary waste. Matter disposed of at sea or on
land on the other side of the globe will find its way into the ecological
cycle. Russia's dumping practices of the past have not borne this in
mind. Yet Russia's nuclear-waste problems are not without solutions.
Even if the West were to write a check tomorrow for the construction
of nuclear waste facilities, Russia still would face the lack of a com-
prehensive system to ensure that the same difficulty does not occur
again. Simple changes in the West's loan procedures, the implementa-
tion of a new technology-based regulatory scheme, and further land
reforms would help guarantee that some responsible system develops.
It is only with such a system that Russia can kill off the ecological
ghosts which threatened the nation's and the oceans' livelihood.
